The relationship between collective action and intensification of livestock production: the case of Northeastern Burkina Faso

In this paper, we develop a simple game-theoretic model to explore the relationship between management of common pool resources used as an input in livestock production (common pastures) and the adoption of inputs associated with intensified per animal production (veterinary services, purchased fodder, feed concentrates, etc.). Theoretically, it is shown that better managed pastures should lead to increased adoption of complementary inputs but decrease adoption of substitute inputs; impacts on stock levels, however, are ambiguous. An empirical model is developed and applied to data collected in northeast Burkina Faso in 2000 and 2002. Results indicate that better managed pastures, proxied by community-level cooperative capacity indices, are indeed associated with lower purchases of substitute goods, e.g. purchases of low-value feeds and greater purchases of complementary inputs, e.g. high-quality feeds. However, purchase of vaccines, likely to be a compliment in livestock production, is not associated with cooperative capacity.Collective action, game theory, common property, Capacity,

Local-level public goods and collective action

According to the author, "Given the vital importance of public goods in providing basic services necessary for alleviating poverty and in managing the local natural resource base for sustainable development, this brief offers an approach to understanding the problems communities face in providing different kinds of public goods." She examines why some public goods are "easier" to provide than others and why some communities are more successful than others in providing public goods and then explains the implications for policymakers. from Text.Public goods ,Poverty alleviation ,Collective action ,

Institutional options for managing rangelands

"This brief considers the benefits and costs of alternative tenure and institutional arrangements and the impact of existing legal and policy frameworks on the sustainability and equity of pastoral production systems under three categories of landownership: (1) state ownership; (2) individual ownership; and (3) common property... Achieving efficient, equitable, and sustainable rangeland management depends on the costs and benefits of alternative systems. These costs and benefits, in turn, depend on agroecological, sociocultural, and economic characteristics. The conservation and management of rangelands require not only tenure security, but also an understanding of local livestock production and risk management strategies and factors that promote collective action, which can then be integrated into national policy formulation strategies and project designs." from Text.Property rights ,Public goods ,Poverty alleviation ,Common property ,Collective action ,

THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PRICE INSURANCE TO IMPROVE WELFARE OF HONDURAN COFFEE PRODUCERS

Coffee is the major export crop in Honduras, but the export price is relatively low. This paper investigates the potential role for a coffee price insurance product - based on the use of the coffee future market - to increasing producer welfare by reducing coffee price risk faced by individual farmers. By constructing a typology of six different types of coffee farmers and developing a forecasting model, the authors show that more risk-averse farmers would prefer to buy the insurance contract than those with lower risk aversion. The subjective assessments analysis also show that Honduran coffee producers have optimistic expectations for coffee prices and appear to underestimate the variability of coffee prices.Risk and Uncertainty,

Participation by men and women in off-farm activities: An empirical analysis in rural northern Ghana

"Using survey data from the Upper East region of Ghana collected in 2005, the paper evaluates the household- and community-level factors influencing women's and men's decisions to participate in off-farm activities, either in the off-farm labor market or in local community groups, and the relationship with on-farm crop returns. Results indicate that crop returns are not affected by increased labor availability over a certain labor-land ratio. Female participation in off-farm labor markets increases at higher levels of labor availability, but participation in women's groups' only increases as labor scarcity is relaxed at lower levels. Alternatively, male participation in off-farm work increases over all levels of labor availability. Results also indicate that male labor is relatively more productive on-farm versus off-farm than female labor, and, though education increases the likelihood that both women and men will work off-farm (with no impact on crop revenues), the impact is greater for women. Finally, participation in off-farm work does not appear to be driven by the need to reduce exposure to risk or to manage risk ex post; wealthier households located in wealthier communities are more likely to participate in off-farm work. Evidence for participation in groups and risk is more complicated; wealthier households in wealthier communities are also more likely to participate, but so too are female-headed households with higher dependency ratios." from authors' abstractOff-farm labor supply, Participation, Community groups, Gender, Land management, Poverty reduction,

Herd Mobility and Waterpoint Use in Northern Kenya

In many regions of the world, property rights to natural resources are held under various forms of communal ownership, which often exhibit flexibility for users to access different resources depending on relative need. Here, we analyze the impact of climatic variability on resource use, and examine the transactions cost of access in these flexible systems.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Climatic variability and cooperation in rangeland management: a case study from Niger

In this paper, we develop an empirical model of an agro-pastoral system subject to high climatic risk to test the impact of rainfall variability on livestock densities, land allocation patterns and herd mobility observed at the community level. Also, because grazing land is a common-pool resource, we determine the impact of cooperation on these decision variables. To capture different abilities of communities to manage these externalities, we construct indices comprised of factors considered to affect the costliness of achieving successful cooperation found in the collective action literature. We then test hypotheses regarding the impact of rainfall variability and cooperation using data collected in a semi-arid region of Niger. Results indicate that rainfall variability first leads to higher and then lower stock densities, indicating that benefits of accumulating large herds in variable environments are eventually offset by the higher risks of low production and higher mortality. Communities with characteristics hypothesized to favor cooperation have lower stock densities and greater herd mobility. Neither cooperation nor rainfall variability has a significant impact on the proportion of land allocated to crops vs. common pastures.Environmental management,

Liability Rules, Collective Organizations and the Provision of Food Safety

Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda

In many African countries, governments are re-thinking the role of the state in centrally providing certain goods and services. The rights and responsibilities for providing various public goods are being decentralized to lower levels of government administration, and/or being devolved directly to local citizens or user groups themselves. It is thus critical to ask: under what circumstances will local groups provide the socially optimal level of the public good? In this paper, we apply this question to the case of controlling an important vector-borne livestock disease in Uganda, trypanosomosis, which is transmitted by the tsetse fly. We investigate the underlying epidemiology of transmission and different options for control, and the implications for group provision of control, within the framework of a game-theoretic model. Results indicate that individual incentives to uptake tsetse and trypanosomosis control differ widely across different control methods. Since the costs of successfully implementing collective action are affected by individual incentives to participate in collective action, the model predicts which method/s are likely to be successfully implemented at the community level. More broadly, the model highlights under what circumstances community-provision is not likely to be optimal, depending on the underlying epidemiology of the disease, technological parameters, prevailing market characteristics, and socio-cultural conditions.